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This paper maps out different conceptions and dynamic accounts of convention developed 
within game theory, Post Keynesian economics and the économie des conventions.  These 
accounts are distinguished in terms of the way in which they conceive of uncertainty (as 




Ce texte compare les différentes conceptions de la notion de convention développée au sein 
de la théorie des jeux, de l'approche post-keynésienne et de l'économie des conventions. Cette 
comparaison permet de montrer que la manière de comprendre la dynamique des conventions 
dépend de la forme d'incertitude retenue (probabilisable ou radicale).  
 
 
In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  significant  increase  in  economic  research  on  social 
conventions motivated by the work of economists such as H. Peyton Young (1996, 1998a) 
and Robert Sugden (1986) who build on the early contributions of the philosopher David 
Lewis (1969). Prior to this surge in interest, discussions of convention in economics had been 
tied to the analysis of John Maynard Keynes‟s economic and philosophical writings. More 
specifically,  convention  had  been  studied  almost  exclusively  by  „radical  Keynesian‟ 
economists‟
5, building principally on the Treatise on Probability (1921), Chapter 12 of the 
General Theory (1936), and Keynes‟s Quarterly Journal of Economics article (1937). These 
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two literatures are distinct and have very little overlap: game-theorists make sparse references 
to Keynes if any at all. 
  Yet,  this  confluence  of  interests  raises  some  interesting  methodological  questions. 
Does the use of a common term such as convention denote a genuine set of shared concerns? 
Can we identify anything that differentiates the mainstream game theoretic models from the 
heterodox Keynesian accounts? This article maps out the three most developed accounts of 
convention within economics and discusses their relations with each other in an attempt to 
provide an answer. 
Some  preliminary  conceptual  clarification  is  essential  before  we  can  develop  our 
argument. Given the relative novelty of the economic study of conventions, it is perhaps no 
surprise that there is no „standard‟ definition of the concept. Fortunately, at least four general 
features  of  convention  appear  to  be  widely  accepted  by  economists  and  give  a  certain 
coherence to the existing literature: 
 
1.  Conventions involve coordination between agents  
2.  Conventions involve regularities in behaviour 
3.  Conventions are arbitrary 
4.  Conventions are responses to uncertainty 
 
There is little dispute about the significance of features 1-3. It can safely be assumed that most 
economists understand roughly the same thing when they speak of regularities in behaviour 
and  coordination
6.  The  idea  that  conventions  are  arbitrary  can  also  be  stated  in 
uncontroversial terms: conventional coordination is peculiar in the sense that  –  for every 
actual conventional practice – one or more equally desirable alternatives could have been 
adopted. Uncertainty, on the other hand, has been interpreted in different ways and has been 
the locus of fierce debate between the heterodoxy and the mainstream since the early 20
th 
century (Knight 1921). 
We contend that the controversy surrounding uncertainty is the key to understanding 
recent discussions of convention since the Keynesian conception of uncertainty is essential for 
the explication of the split between heterodox and mainstream theories. We will show that, 
despite  significant  developments  in  game  theory,  the  mainstream  account  of  convention 
remains  committed  to  conceptualising  conventions  as  solutions  to  the  „problem  of 
                                                 
6 Though this should not be taken to imply that these ideas are unproblematic in themselves (Latsis 2005, p. 715, 
pp.719-20).    3 
uncertainty‟. Their role is to facilitate coordination by reducing players‟ perceptions of the 
risk  of  default  or  cheating.  It  is  essential  for  our  argument  to  distinguish  the  concept  of 
„solution‟ from the related ideas of „equilibrium‟ and „stability‟. In referring to game theoretic 
conventions  as  solutions  we  are  drawing  attention  to  their  mathematical  properties  (as 
solutions to equations) and to their relationship with uncertainty. In the remainder of this 
paper  the  term  „solution‟  is  not  equivalent  to  the  notion  of  equilibrium  employed  by 
mainstream economists
7. Conventions may introduce (temporary)  stability but they are not 
solutions  because  they  do  not  eliminate  uncertainty  from  social  situations  –  they  merely 
transform agents‟ representations of it. 
In  this  framework,  uncertainty  is  understood  in  probabilistic  terms.  However, 
developments in the study of uncertainty within Post Keynesian economics have outlined a 
conception of „true uncertainty‟ in terms that distance Post Keynesians from the mainstream 
view of uncertainty as risk. In a parallel development, another radical Keynesian school of 
thought – the économie des conventions – has investigated how true uncertainty transforms 
social practices, challenging the mainstream view of conventions as solutions. We conclude 
our paper by reflecting on what these contrasting approaches to convention reveal about the 




Part I  
 
The game theory of conventions 
 
Game theory appears to support the case for the renewed openness of mainstream economics 
towards the study of social phenomena that were once ignored by the discipline. At the same 
time, game theory‟s language and proximity with mathematics have helped to establish it 
within economics. It has often been deployed at the frontier of traditional theory to study the 
paradoxes of rationality, equitable allocations and reciprocal and tit-for-tat strategies. Thus it 
                                                 
7 One way of understanding equilibrium is to relate it to the notion of gravitational centres (Harcourt 1982; 
Eatwell 1996). The latter can be seen as the implied empirical outcomes of a system where the persistent, non-
accidental, and non-temporary forces present are allowed to fully work themselves out. They are not, and do not 
need to be, consistent with observed empirical patterns, but they must exercise regulatory control over those 
variables.   4 
is no surprise that game theorists have been amongst the first economists to apply economic 
modes of reasoning to the study of new phenomena. 
A central problem of economics concerns how the multiple and decentralised actions of 
economic agents can come to coordinate at a unique equilibrium and game theorists suggested 
a way out: they began to investigate how they might use convention as a solution concept. 
With the introduction of convention, game theory introduced a foreign idea into its standard 
formal framework, a nomadic concept that represents common forms of social behaviour as 
non-reflective (that is to say not based on sophisticated rational expectations). This is how 
Sugden (1986, p. 32) introduces the concept of convention before going on to define it more 
strictly in terms of an equilibrium in a game.  
 
 Consider what we mean when we say that some practice is a convention among 
some group of people.  When we say this,  we  usually mean that everyone, or 
almost everyone, in the group follows the practice. But we mean more than this. 
Everyone eats  and sleeps,  but  these are not  conventions.  When we say that a 
practice is a convention, we imply that at least part of the answer to the question 
‘Why does everyone do X ?’ is ‘Because everyone else does X’. We also imply 
that things might have been otherwise : everyone does X because everyone else 
does X, but it might have been the case that everyone did Y because everyone else 
did Y. If asked ‘Why does everyone do X and not Y ?’, we may find it hard to 
give any answer at all. Why do British drivers drive on the left rather than the 
right ? No doubt there is some historical reason why this practice grew up, but 
most British drivers neither know nor care what it is. It seems sufficient to say that 
this  is  the  established  convention.  I  shall  define  a  convention  as :  any  stable 
equilibrium in a game that has two or more stable equilibria. (Sugden 1986, p. 32) 
 
Sugden‟s strict definition is shared by all game theoretic models of convention. By 
definition, a convention is an equilibrium in a co-ordination game – that is to say a game with 
multiple equilibria – and to follow a convention is a social process of equilibrium selection. A 
convention is a solution. The relevance of convention to economics is directly attributable to 
its beneficial consequences (as a stable equilibrium) as it permits successful co-ordination 
where co-ordination might not have been possible due to the existence of multiple equilibria. 
Young  (1998b)  follows  exactly  the  same  logic:  convention  is  introduced  by  the  theorist 
because of its desirable economic consequences for the actors. 
 
To capture the social dimension of convention, we could say that a convention is 
equilibrium behavior in a game played repeatedly by many different individuals in 
society, where the behaviors are widely know to be customary. […] What, though, 
is the relationship between social convention and economic welfare ? At one level   5 
the  answer  is  simple  enough :  conventions  reduce  transaction  costs  by 
coordinating expectations and reducing uncertainty. (Young 1998b, p. 823) 
 
This second definition is more specific. The game must be repeated within a given 
population of players in order to reproduce the necessary behavioural regularity: it marks out 
Young‟s approach as evolutionary game theory. Moreover, Young redescribes the problem of 
equilibrium selection as a problem of choice under „uncertainty‟ and provides an economic 
raison d‟￪tre for conventions as an aide to co-ordination under uncertainty. 
A review of the different types of games proposed by game theorists of convention 
serves to illustrate how models place varying emphasis on uncertainty. Consider the class of 
co-ordination games where two players have the same two strategies and where payoffs are 
such that there are multiple, pure Nash equilibira. Depending on the value of the payoffs, the 
equilibria vary and the properties of payoff dominance and risk dominance of these equilibria 
also vary (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Thus the diversity of equilibria and their properties 
determine the degree of uncertainty in co-ordination.  
The rendezvous, stag hunt, driving, telephone, crossroads and hawk-dove games are 
six different types of co-ordination game, each with two Nash equilibria. In the first three 
types of game the players must choose the same strategy (in the rendezvous game they must 
go to the same place to meet; in the stag hunt they must hunt the same prey; in the driving 
game they must drive on the same side of the road). In the other three games, the players must 
choose opposing but complementary strategies (in the telephone game one must call back 
whilst the other waits; in the crossroads game one slows down and the other maintains speed; 
in the hawk-dove game one plays hawk the other plays dove). There is no sense in which 
there is a „better‟ strategy that can be systematically adopted by one player: in each of these 
games, the players choices are interdependent. It is the absence of such a strategy, due to the 
multiplicity  of  equilibria,  that  creates  what  game  theorists  such  as  Young  have  called 
uncertainty. 
The rendezvous and stag hunt games are co-ordination games where the equilibria are 
payoff and risk dominant. In these games uncertainty boils down to the well-known problem 
of co-ordination failure (Cooper and John 1988): players can co-ordinate at a sub-optimal 
equilibrium if they are not sensitive to the property of payoff-dominance of one of the two 
equilibria. They can only follow the established convention. Coordination is assured at the 
cost of efficiency. In the stag hunt the risk of co-ordination failure is higher because the 
payoff dominated equilibrium is risk dominant. This means that once there is a doubt about   6 
the other player‟s move, the strategy of hunting hares becomes the less risky option even 
though the stag is more nutritious if caught (i.e. it provides a higher payoff). In this case the 
convention stabilises a behaviour that is globally inefficient though less susceptible to non co-
ordinated outcomes.
8  
In the other four games, properties of payoff and risk dominance cannot be used in 
equilibrium selection, hence there is heightened uncertainty. In fact, the driving and telephone 
games are of pivotal importance as they are the only pure co -ordination games where the 
players are completely indifferent between strategies. These games are crucial to the game 
theoretic literature on convention because they bring out the arbitrariness of convention. On 
the other hand, in the crossroads and hawk-dove games the players are faced with Stackelberg 
equilibria which present conflicts of interest between them: each player has a preference for a 
particular equilibrium. The hawk-dove game is the most conflictual of the two in that the dove 
player has a strict preference for the other player to play dove as well. In this context the 
convention no longer resolves pure uncertainty, rather it resolves a situation of conflict  by 
stabilising an order of priority between the players. 
In all these cases the convention provides a solution that allows agents to avoid further 
layers of higher order calculations and expectations. Individuals who co-ordinate by following 
a convention do not submit to a particular law or prescription, nor have they signed a contract. 
The convention is a pre -established solution, an existing regularity that is of an entirely 
different nature to a law or a contract. The role of the convention is to select  an equilibrium 
amongst several, because whilst agents have the capacity to calculate the equilibria, they fail 
to co-ordinate on one of them (Rabin 1994). 
David Lewis, the pioneer of the game theory of conventions, claims to reconcile 
rationality and convention. His research proposed to develop a response to the language 
paradox articulated by his mentor, Willard Quine
9. His aim was to show that rational agents 
would follow conventions and that they could do so without agreement, purely on the basis of 
precedent  (Lewis  1969,  pp.   35-42).  But  there  is  a  logical  incompatibility  between  the 
rationality postulate as formulated by mainstream economics and the idea that agents might 
follow precedent. Economic rationality has difficulty accounting for the type of sa lience that 
is  essential  to  Lewis‟s  account  of  convention  (Gilbert  1990;  Miller  1990)  because  this 
                                                 
8  For  a  more  recent  example,  consider  the  following  situation  discussed  by  Goyal  and  Janssen,  where  the 
convention concerns the choice of a network technology. An inferior technology   can drive out a superior 
technology  if  communicates better with  than  does with  (Goyal and Janssen 1997). 
9 The paradox was this: do we need language to agree on the meaning of words (the basic conventions of 
language) in order to create a language ?    7 
rationality is exclusively forward-looking (Janssen 1998): a strategy is rational at time t if and 
only if it maximises expected utility from t into the indefinite future. Precedent could, of 
course, allow agents to co-ordinate their expectations, but once the rationality of agents is 
common  knowledge  in  a  given  population,  expectations  will  be  based  on  the  canons  of 
rationality  rather  than  the  reproduction  of  past  behaviour
10. All equilibria  –  not  just  the 
incumbent one – are consistent with rational behaviour under these conditions, so economic 
rationality and convention following cannot co-exist.  
This  diagnosis  explains  the  fact  that  within  mainstream  economics  the  concept  of 
convention has been developed in evolutionary game theory (Young 1993) rather than the 
classical  game  form  that  Lewis  first  suggested.  In  evolutionary  game  theory  agents  are 
backward-looking, so that they base their present decisions only on the observation of past 
regularities. Not only are they backward looking, but they are also naïve: period after period 
agents choose their strategies reacting purely to the past states of the system and thus only 
unintentionally contributing to its evolution (Mailath 1998). The agents of evolutionary game 
theory have bounded rationality: they follow precedent blindly, unaware of alternative courses 
of action. The spontaneous order achieved is the product of this limitation imposed on their 
cognitive capacities, it is not planned or premeditated (Sugden 1989). 
Nevertheless,  evolutionary  game  theory  retains  a  form  of  bounded  rationality  that 
remains calculative. Its major innovation is to limit the data upon which these calculations are 
based to information from past periods whilst excluding all knowledge of the future. The 
decision rules applied by players in evolutionary games fundamentally rely on expected utility 
calculations  that  are  conditional  on  the  prior  states  of  the  system.  In  this  case,  the 
„uncertainty‟ surrounding equilibrium choice is resolved through the calculation of a weighted 
average  of  past  behaviours  in  the  population.  Thus  the  limited  rationality  postulated  by 
evolutionary game theorists does not expose agents to genuine uncertainty. Instead, adaptive 
                                                 
10 A rational agent is not bound by her past action (Miller 1990, p. 25). As a rational convention follower, my 
own past conformity is not in itself an adequate reason for present conformity. And I will not expect another 
rational convention follower to conform in the present just because she has conformed in the past. Gilbert (1990, 
pp. 10-11) describes the case of an interrupted telephone call where each agent has the option of calling back or 
waiting to be called (the telephone game). Previously, Betty and Sue solved their problem: the original caller 
called back. But what now? Betty might reason as follows: 
“I should conform to precedent now, if Sue does. And Sue will realize that it is obvious that she should 
conform to precedent if I do. She will therefore ask: „Will Betty conform to precedent?‟ If Sue starts 
reviewing my reasoning she will soon see that reason-replication will get her no further than it gets 
me!” 
Therefore,  common  knowledge  of  precedent  will  not,  by  itself,  automatically  generate  expectations  of 
conformity or conformity on the part of rational agents in the game-theoretical sense (Gilbert 1990, p. 10).   8 
behaviours are propagated through the population in response to individual interactions in an 
environment characterised by probabilistic risk.  
This construction is formalised as a dynamic system (Kandori, Mailath and Rob 1993) 
in  which  the  modeller  can  predict  which  out  of  a  number  of  alternative  behavioural 
regularities will emerge as the dominant one in a given population. Deviant behaviour is 
possible within this framework: a random noise variable means that individual agents can 
„mutate‟ and adopt  any alternative equilibrium strategy. However, the system  as  a whole 
converges on a unique convention in the long run. In this way, evolutionary game theory 
explains the emergence of convention without relying on individual strategic behaviour or 
standard models of economic rationality. The historical emergence of a behavioural regularity 
is  described  in  terms  of  a  self-organising  ergodic  system  whose  dynamics  are  both 
independent of historical contingency and perfectly predictable (Young 1993). 
Game theory introduces conventions as solution concepts in an attempt to construct a 
stable social order in an uncertain environment populated by agents with bounded rationality. 
Superficially, this appears to distance the game theorists from mainstream accounts of social 
order. However their in-depth analysis of the properties of stochastic dynamics is very much 
in keeping with the modelling focus of mainstream theory. Moreover, their attachment to the 
mathematical tools of modern economics has two important consequences for their approach: 
i) convention cannot be understood independently of its status as a solution; ii) the calculative 
rationality of the agents transforms uncertainty into a probabilistic choice between perfectly 
known alternatives (i.e. the multiple equilibria of the game).    9 
Part II 
 
Uncertainty and convention in Post Keynesian economics 
 
As noted in Part I, both mainstream and heterodox approaches to convention recognise the 
relationship between convention and uncertainty. We have already seen that, in the case of 
game theory, probabilistic accounts of uncertainty are standard. Our contention is that the 
refinement  of  the  concept  of  uncertainty  undertaken  by  Post  Keynesians
11  provides  an 
alternative that underpins a contrasting heterodox  approach to convention. As we shall see, 
this alternative framework prepares the ground for another radical break with the economic 
orthodoxy: it challenges the very idea of conventions as solutions. 
The role of uncertainty in Keynes‟s system is complicated by an unusual aspect of his 
work: he wrote two influential books that touched on the topic, one in philosophy (A Treatise 
on Probability) and one in  economics (The  General  Theory of  Employment,  Interest  and 
Money). The exact relation between these texts is a matter of debate amongst interpreters of 
Keynes. Within the Post Keynesian literature there is a noticeable difference between those 
seeking  to  discover  what  Keynes  „really‟  thought
12  and  those  aiming  to  appropriate  and 
develop his insights for current analytical usage. It is principally the latter group that interests 
us in this article since assessing the Keynesian pedigree of Post Keynesian ideas is not part of 
our  argument.  Nevertheless,  some  of  the  analytical  developments  of  the  Post  Keynesian 
concept of uncertainty stem from the history of thought literature and we shall refer to these 
as and when it is appropriate. 
  There is  a well-established interpretation  of Keynes‟s later economic  writings  that 
emphasises  what  Post  Keynesians  call  true  (or  radical)  uncertainty.  The  key  sources  of 
textual evidence for this interpretation are in Chapter 12 of the General Theory (GT) and the 
1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics article (QJE). In the GT, uncertainty is introduced in 
the discussion of long-run expectations. More specifically, Keynes emphasises the barriers to 
establishing confidence in expectations concerning the future value of investments.  
 
                                                 
11 The boundaries of Post Keynesian economics are difficult to determine precisely. In spite of wider usage in the 
period following Keynes‟s death, the label „Post Keynesian‟ has come to be associated with a dissident group of 
heterodox economists  since the 1970s. This community identifies itself as Post Keynesian and has its own 
journals,  conferences  and  seminars.  The  label  has  often  been  used  to  stress  differences  with  mainstream 
economics and, in particular, the rejection of the neoclassical synthesis (King 2002, p. 6). 
12 Though the latter project undoubtedly plays a valuable part in the PK literature, our primary interest here is in 
the analysis and development of the concept of uncertainty that it has engendered rather than its accuracy as an 
interpretation of Keynes.   10 
The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on 
which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made. (Keynes 1936, p. 149) 
 
He uses examples such as the ten-year yield of a railway, a copper mine, or the goodwill of a 
patent medicine, to show that the grounds of our forecasts are either flimsy or absent. He goes 
on  to  describe  how  the  transition  from  an  „entrepreneurial‟  economy  to  a  „speculative‟ 
economy can exacerbate this problem since the division of management and ownership and 
the  speed  and  frequency  of  transactions,  threatens  the  stability  of  the  economic  system 
(Keynes 1936, p. 151). So investment decisions have dynamic effects on the level of current 
investment; they increase the likelihood of market fluctuations and make consistently accurate 
forecasting impossible. 
  A year later in the QJE, Keynes juxtaposed his position with the „classics‟. He 
claimed that though they allowed for change, they only incorporated it in cases where agents‟ 
expectations could not be disappointed. Mathematically calculable probabilities described the 
likelihood of past, present and future events in exactly the same manner. 
 
The calculus of probability, though mention of it was kept in the background, was 
supposed to be capable of reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as 
that of certainty itself... (Keynes 1937, pp. 112-113) 
 
Keynes  believed  that  in  many  cases,  our  expectations  about  the  future  did  not  fit  this 
framework because they could not be the subject of probabilistic calculation. 
 
About these matters there is no scientific basis upon which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know. (Ibid, p. 114) 
 
The exact meaning of these citations is still a matter of some dispute, but the belief that they 
introduce  a  fundamental  distinction  between  calculable  probability  (or  risk)  and  true 
uncertainty is now widespread amongst Post Keynesians. 
  Post  Keynesians  have  discussed  the  topic  of  uncertainty  since  at  least  the  1970s 
(Davidson  1972,  p.  102n).  More  recently,  as  some  have  turned  from  policy  questions  to 
methodological reflection, the recognition of true uncertainty has been viewed as one of the 
fundamental characteristics of the Post Keynesian school. In a 1996 literature survey in the 
Cambridge  Journal  of  Economics,  Philip  Arestis  cited  three  fundamental  traditions  upon 
which Post Keynesianism draws, the first of which, „stresses uncertainty, which is thought of 
as an inherent aspect of events viewed in historical time‟. He goes on to specify what he   11 
means, putting forward a version of true uncertainty that has become dominant within the 
tradition. First, he claims that the future is unknown to agents, stressing their epistemic frailty: 
 
The  future  is  unknowable  in  advance  and  agents  cannot  construct  objective 
probability distributions, because past distributions are non-stationary even if they 
exist (i.e. economic events are time-dependent). (Arestis 1996, p. 113) 
 
Later, he explains this epistemic frailty by reference to the nature of the social world and 
outlines the implicit ontology of Post Keynesianism: 
 
The essence of uncertainty in post-Keynesian economic theory is grounded in a 
non-ergodic, non-deterministic world understood as an open system. (ibid, p. 117) 
 
  Arestis‟s position is repeated in subsequent accounts of the role of uncertainty in Post 
Keynesian economics (McKenna and Zannoni 2000, p. 331). A recent comprehensive history 
of Post Keynesianism confirms the centrality of true uncertainty by devoting an entire chapter 
to the discussion of „Uncertainty, expectations and method‟ (King 2002, pp. 181-202). Like 
Arestis, King draws attention to both the epistemic and ontological component of the concept 
(ibid, pp. 184-189). King‟s book also draws particular attention to two authors within the Post 
Keynesian tradition who dedicated a significant part of their careers to demonstrating the 
importance of uncertainty for the analysis of economic processes: George Shackle and Paul 
Davidson. 
  Shackle was a crucial forerunner of the Post Keynesian discussion of uncertainty. He 
was the originator of the „radical subjectivist‟ approach to economics  which claimed that 
agents  cannot  possess  any  knowledge  about  the  future  (1955;  1972,  pp.  155-229).  His 
approach emphasised the epistemic limits of decision-making and their roots in Keynes‟s 
economics. 
 
The deliberate self-deception of business, in supposing its investment decisions to 
be founded on knowledge and to be rationally justifiable; the insecurity of its faith 
in its own judgements, which the awareness of this self-deception engenders; the 
paralysis  of  decision  and  enterprise  which  can  result  when  the  structure  of 
pretended knowledge is violently overthrown by events; this central core of the 
General Theory is to be found in Chapter 12... (Shackle 1967, p. 132) 
 
Shacklean  agents  do  not  possess  probabilistic  estimates  about  future  states  of  the  world. 
Instead,  when  faced  with  a  decision,  they  use  their  imaginations  to  construct  possible   12 
alternatives: they create rather than discover. In this framework agents are aware that their 
predictions are conjectures and that their plans are susceptible to the imagination of other 
independent agents; they are conscious of uncertainty. Moreover, their forecasts are affected 
by their desires (leading to optimism) and their fears can lead them to ignore crucial elements 
of their situations. 
Shackle was never closely affiliated to the Post Keynesian community and worked 
mostly on his own. This meant that, despite his groundbreaking contribution, he had relatively 
little direct influence on the development of Post Keynesian research (King 2002, p. 187). On 
the question of uncertainty his influence was felt partly through the contributions of Paul 
Davidson. Davidson remains one of the most influential Post Keynesian economists and is 
largely responsible for stimulating the more detailed analysis of true uncertainty. He began 
from a critique of classical and neoclassical economics, claiming that both assume a long run 
equilibrium that is independent of initial conditions (the ergodic hypothesis, which is also 
found in the evolutionary game theory of Young). The ergodic hypothesis serves to rule out 
path dependent processes by assuming that they have no effect on the eventual stable state of 
the  economic  system.  Its  employment  effectively  makes  all  contingent  events  –  and 
consequently history – analytically irrelevant to economics (Davidson 1982-83).  
In emphasising the difficulty of prediction and the creative aspects of choice, Post 
Keynesians  explicitly  deny  a  crucial  assumption  of  mainstream  economics:  that  past 
probabilities can provide us with grounds for predictions of future events (Davidson 1991, 
p. 130). Davidson‟s agents suffer from the same epistemic frailty as Shackle‟s: 
 
... [in cases of true uncertainty] the economic agent believes that during the time 
between the moment of choice and the payoff, unforeseeable changes will occur. 
The decision maker believes that no information regarding future prospects exists 
today and therefore the future is not calculable. (Davidson 1991, p. 131) 
 
But Davidson is also explicit in developing the ontological component of Post Keynesian 
uncertainty. It is not simply that agents are unable to predict future events due to cognitive or 
other impediments, the economic system as a whole displays non-ergodic qualities
13; 
 
For Keynes and the Post Keynesians, long-run uncertainty is associated with a 
nonergodic and transmutable reality concept. (Davidson 1996, p. 492) 
                                                 
13 According to Davidson this is one of three characteristics that distinguish Post Keynesian economics from the 
mainstream. The other two are the non-neutrality of money and the lack of gross substitutability between money 
and other goods.   13 
 
  So far we have suggested that there is a significant convergence in the Post Keynesian 
literature around the distinction between probabilistic calculation and true uncertainty in line 
with  Davidson‟s  emphasis  on  non-ergodicity.  Indeed,  this  appears  to  be  the  case  for  the 
majority of Post Keynesians who have appropriated Keynes‟s ideas in order to further their 
theoretical projects. However, the contributions discussed above have been supplemented by a 
large secondary literature on Keynes‟s philosophy that grew out of the compilation of his 
collected works in the 1980s (King 2002, p 181-182). Research by Lawson (1985; 1988), 
Carabelli (1988), Fitzgibbons (1988), O‟Donnell (1989), Runde (1990), Bateman and Davis 
(1991) and Bateman (1996) departs from prior Post Keynesian approaches by focussing on 
the re-reading of Keynes‟s Treatise on Probability (TP) and a number of unpublished student 
papers by Keynes that had recently been discovered in the Marshall Library in Cambridge. 
This philosophical work is particularly concerned with the connection between the conception 
of  uncertainty  that  emerges  from  his  later  economic  works  and  Keynes‟s  theory  of 
probability. The analysis of uncertainty within the interpretative literature is also essential to a 
dispute  about  the  consistency  between  Keynes‟s  early  and  mature  beliefs  that  has  been 
dubbed „the continuity debate‟. 
  Keynes‟s theory  of probability is  unusual  in  that  he conceives of probability as a 
logical  relation  between propositions.  Though it incorporates deductive  logic as  a special 
case, the principal target of Keynes‟s theory is the relation of partial implication. In other 
words, he is concerned with rational but non-conclusive argument (Keynes 1921, p. 56). In 
TP, probabilities link some set of evidential premises (h) to a conclusion (a) and can be 
represented by the formula a / h (which should be read as „a relative to h‟). Agents „perceive‟ 
probabilities,  making  their  judgments  relative  to  the  available  evidence
14.  Nevertheless, 
probabilities themselves are judged to be objective and their objectivity is derived from logic 
rather than nature (ibid, p. 4)
15. It is also important to note that Keynes‟s theory diverges 
significantly from subsequent purely mathematical treatments of probability. All probabilities 
lie on a continuum stretching from certainty (where a / h = 1) to impossibility (where a / h = 
0). However, according to Keynes, few can be expressed in numerical terms (ibid: 70) and 
                                                 
14 Not all individuals possess the same logical intuition or ability, thus preventing some from seeing probability 
relations „accurately‟. This element of Keynes‟s system is taken as evidence of his commitment to some form of 
Platonism about probabilities (O‟Donnell 1989; Bateman 1991; Gillies 2003). 
15 That is to say, they do not represent stable patterns in events to be discovered in na ture. This distinguishes 
Keynes‟s view from the frequentist interpretation of probability, which also posits objective probabilities.   14 
many cannot be ordinally compared either (ibid, p. 73)
16. A final element of Keynes‟s theory 
deserves mention in connection with uncertainty: the weight of argument. Weight provides an 
alternative method for comparing arguments that is independent of probability. In TP, Keynes 
tells us that: 
 
One argument has more weight than another if it is based on a greater amount of 
relevant evidence. (Keynes 1921, p. 84) 
 
Whilst comparisons of probability rest on judgments about the balance of evidence for and 
against a particular argument, any evidence (whether favourable or unfavourable) increases 
weight.  
  Proponents  of  the  continuity  thesis  attempted  to  anchor  Post  Keynesian 
uncertainty in the overlapping concerns of the TP, GT and the QJE article. Lawson (1985, p. 
914)  and  O‟Donnell  (1989,  p.  78)  point  towards  situations  in  which  both  numerical 
measurement and ordinal comparison are impossible – either due to a failure of perception or 
the absence of a probability relation – as key to the Keynesian conception of uncertainty
17. 
This  interpretation  of  Keynes‟s  theory  of  probability  dovetails  with  the  Post  Keynesian 
tradition  and  re-affirms  the  view  that  Keynes‟s  position  is  consistent  with  the  Knightian 
distinction between uncertainty and risk presented in our introduction
18. Some proponents of 
the  continuity  thesis  such  as  Runde  (1990)  and  O‟Donnell  (1989,  pp.  67-80)  interpret 
Keynes‟s  concept  of  the  weight  of  arguments  as  another  form  of  uncertainty.  Runde 
speculates that a slightly modified conception of weight could fall with the accumulation of 
relevant,  unfavourable  evidence.  If  Runde  is  correct,  then  a  plausible  parallel  can  be 
established between weight and the „state of confidence‟ discussed in Chapter 12 of the GT 
and explicitly noted by Keynes (1936, p. 148n). The discussion of weight in connection with 
Keynes‟s philosophy should also be seen as lending support to the established Post Keynesian 
emphasis on the state of confidence for the analysis of uncertainty. 
However, as we hinted earlier, some commentators have not been convinced by the 
continuity thesis. Bateman (1991; 1996), Davis (1994; 1996) and Gillies (2003) have argued 
for a decisive break between Keynes‟s early and later work based on the impact of Frank 
                                                 
16 This may coincide with, but is not equivalent to, a probability being „unknown‟ in the sense that individuals 
cannot perceive a probability relation due to a failure of logical insight (O‟Donnell 1989, p. 51). 
17 O‟Donnell use of „uncertainty‟ is wider in that he identifies three types of uncertainty corresponding to the 
three possible objects of knowledge in TP: probability, weight and unknown probability.  
18  There is one proviso, however. In some cases of Knightian uncertainty  –  where  probabilities  are  not 
mathematically calculable – agents may still have knowledge of or access to non-numerical probability relations 
(Runde 2003, pp. 47-48).   15 
Ramsey‟s critique of TP. Proponents of the discontinuity thesis claim that Keynes abandoned 
his  early  theory  of  probability  when  faced  with  Ramsey‟s  claim  that  there  could  be  no 
objective basis for probability, and instead adopted (some form of) subjectivist view that was 
immune to the critique. In support of this point, proponents of discontinuity have emphasised 
the influence of G. E. Moore‟s neo-Platonist ethics on the young Keynes (Bateman 1996, 
pp. 19-37) and its subsequent translation into his theory of probability (Bateman 1996, pp. 48-
49;  Gillies 2003, p. 115). Bateman then draws on textual evidence to  claim  that Keynes 
abandoned his youthful neo-Platonism and conceded defeat to Ramsey on the question of 
objective versus subjective probabilities (Keynes CW X, pp. 437-438)
19. 
  Whatever the historical mer it of these claims they have led to a tentative 
subjectivist framing of uncertainty within the broader Post Keynesian literature. This move 
was necessary because a subjectivist (or intersubjectivist) account renders the Knightian 
distinction between risk and uncertainty very difficult to sustain. On a standard interpretation 
of subjectivism, probabilities are the degrees of belief of individuals, measured by their 
willingness to place bets on the likelihood of future events and – by the Dutch Book argument 
–  these  bets  can  be  interpreted  as  mathematically  tractable  probabilities  (Gillies  2003, 
pp. 117-118). This has two consequences for the Post Keynesian position on true uncertainty. 
Since  it  cannot  be  related  to  the  basis  of  knowledge,  uncertainty  must  be  regarded  as  a 
psychological phenomenon rather than something that agents necessarily or even occasionally 
face; a position clearly at odds with the ontological element of true uncertainty as emphasised 
by Davidson and other Post Keynesian authors. A second consequence is that – shorn of the 
support of the non-formalistic interpretation of probability found in  TP – Post Keynesian 
resistance to the mathematical analysis of true uncertainty becomes more difficult to sustain
20.  
  The subjectivist interpretation  of Keynes‟s later account of uncertainty is a minority 
position in the interpretative literature (Bateman 1996, p. 8) and, as we have shown, has had 
limited impact on theoretical contributions within Post Keynesianism. In spite of the existence 
of competitors, the emphasis on true uncertainty as non-calculable, ontologically grounded 
and epistemically manifested is at the very core of the Post Keynesian research programme. 
But, as Post Keynesians have pointed out, Keynes‟s account of how people act in situations of 
uncertainty is couched in terms of convention. In the absence of determinate and calculable 
                                                 
19 These interpretative claims are hotly disputed by proponents of the continuity thesis (O‟Donnell 2003). 
20  Though this is not impossible. Davis (2003, p. 109) in particular, argues both for the cogency of the 
discontinuity thesis and for the centrality of „radical uncertainty‟ in Post Keynesian thought.   16 
knowledge  concerning  the  results  of  all  possible  actions,  conventions  form  the  basis  of 
rational action. 
Instead of providing  a general  definition of convention, Keynes  offers a number of 
illustrations. The QJE article gives the most extensive account of the range of conventions 
that can be found in financial markets. In that piece, Keynes delineates three principal types: 
 
(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than 
a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto. In 
other words we largely ignore the prospect of future changes about the actual 
character of which we know nothing. 
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the 
character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, 
so that we can accept it as such unless and until something new and relevant 
comes into the picture. 
(3) Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavour to fall 
back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. 
That is, we endeavour to conform with the behaviour of the majority on average. 
The psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is endeavouring to copy 
the others leads to what we may strictly term a conventional judgment. (Keynes 
1937, p. 114) 
 
Some commentators have suggested that these three examples are perhaps best understood as 
Keynes‟s account of the resources used by investors trying to cope with the overwhelming 
uncertainty of volatile financial markets (Bibow, Lewis and Runde 2003). Post Keynesians 
have long pondered their implications for economics, but few have tried to work out what 
Keynes was trying to pick out with the introduction of the concept of convention. What do the 
three aforementioned examples have in common? Keynes never offered an account of what a 
convention is,  and why and how it might  tie these cases  together. Post  Keynesians have 
mostly remained faithful to Keynes by following his description of market conventions but 
refraining from adding a substantial theory of convention to it. As we have already seen, they 
have concentrated on the analysis of uncertainty. Some, of course, have ventured tentative 
elaborations, but these do not go much beyond citations of Lewis (1969) and brief references 
to „structures of interdependent expectations‟ (Davis 1994, pp. 171-176); or „structures of 
interdependent  judgments‟  (Davis  1997,  p. 210  and  the  concept  remains  relatively  under-
researched within the Post Keynesian tradition. 
It  remains  clear,  however,  that  the  conventions  outlined  in  the  QJE  article  are 
qualitatively different from the conventions discussed by game theorists because, whilst they 
may constitute responses to uncertainty, they are certainly not solutions in our sense. With   17 
some  significant  exceptions
21, Post Keynesians have resisted defining the emergence of 
conventions as a simplistic systemic or functional response that   „reduces‟  or  eliminates 
uncertainty. There are two reasons for this. First, the recognition of true uncertainty means 
that most Post Keynesians are deprived of a metric for determining whether or how much 
uncertainty has been reduced. Second, even when Post Keynesians conceptualise conventions 
as  stabilising  a  particular  social  arrangement,  they  do  so  contingently
22.  The  stabilisation 
afforded by conventions and institutions does not resolve the problem of uncertainty as a rule, 
indeed, it may sometimes exacerbate it (Dequech 2004, p. 372n). At best, then, conventions 
and other stable social arrangements tend to be described quite explicitly in the following 
manner:  
 
In the Post Keynesian vision the world remains non-ergodic, but there are ways to 
cope  with  the  disastrous  outcomes  when  they  occur.  (McKenna  and  Zannoni 
2000, p. 342) 
 
That is to say, they are viewed as coping mechanisms. And, as we have seen, this is a view 
that has strong echoes in Keynes‟s economics
23. 
Another  heterodox  school  in  economics  has  taken  up  the  challenge  of  analysing 
conventions in more detail: the économie des conventions (EC). As with the Post Keynesians, 
one of the founders of the EC finds inspiration in Chapter 12 of the GT and the QJE article for 
what he calls Keynes‟ „radical project‟. According to Favereau (1985, 1988, 2005, 2008), this 
project consists in generalising the true uncertainty found in Keynes‟s account of financial 
markets  to  all economic interactions.  His  contribution and others within the EC  tradition 
represent a reformulation of the Post Keynesian project with a particular emphasis on the 
forms of coordination that result from the operation of true uncertainty. 
 
                                                 
21 Kregel (1980, p. 46) lapses into the functionalist view that „the economic system abhors uncertainty‟ and 
reacts by producing uncertainty-reducing institutions. 
22 See Dequech (2000; 2004) and McKenna and Zannoni (2000) for some recent work in this area. 
23 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out another interesting recent argument from the institutionalist 
literature that emerges from and complements the Post Keynesian debates. Mirr oring the claims of the EC 
below, Wilson claims that the institutions (conventions) of a particular society can transform uncertainty within 
in it (2007, pp. 1100-1101). In this framework, whether institutions eliminate or reduce uncertainty depends, as 
far as we can see, on whether institutions generate numerically tractable probabilities or not.   18 
Part III 
 
The economics of conventions: a further step in the Keynesian argument? 
 
The starting point of the EC project is the recognition that there are a variety of forms of 
evaluation  and  action.  True  uncertainty  is  one  consequence  of  this  variety.  One  of  the 
principle  aims  of  the  EC  is  to  show  that  competing  (and  antagonistic)  accounts  of  co-
ordination from economics and sociology, can be integrated into a more general framework of 
co-ordination using a new set of analytical tools. The concept of „convention‟ is central to this 
framework, since each of these accounts of coordination may be redescribed as a convention. 
Conventionalists depart from the game theoretic tradition and redefine convention as a range 
of consistent interpretations and practices that agents assume to be shared (to some degree) by 
the other participants in the interaction.  
In  discussing  the  EC's  approach  to  convention  we  invoke  practices  rather  than 
„behavioural regularities‟ that have been emphasised in the first two parts of this paper. In a 
radical  break  from  mainstream  economics,  conventionalist  analyses  have  emphasised  the 
interpretative capacity of individuals.  The traditional emphasis  on behavioural  regularities 
was introduced by Lewis precisely in order to circumvent this interpretative level: consistency 
in observed behaviour is all that is required for coordination
24. In contrast, conventionalists 
claim that the similarity judgments allowing varying degrees of reflexive control are crucial to 
coordination. These judgments are, in turn, dependent on the agents‟ representations of the 
group or community they belong to. Such acts of interpretation allow individuals to identify 
appropriate conventional actions that are irreducible to any specific behaviour pattern. These 
interpretations and practices that agents assume to be shared transform uncertainty without 
neutralising it: the supposition that a convention is in fact in place is reinforced by successful 
coordination, but never guaranteed.  
Coordination can however be further supported through external qualified objects and 
mechanisms  endowed  by  form-giving  operations.  The  notion  of  investments  of  form 
(Thévenot 1984; Eymard-Duvernay and Thévenot 1985) is used to make sense of the totality 
of these operations of form-giving. Investments of form produce equivalence across time and 
space through the existence of objects that can consolidate social relations and thus make 
                                                 
24 At least this is the standard interpretation of Lewis‟s position based on his first definition of convention. 
Favereau (2008) shows that in a second version, formulated shortly afterwards in 1971, Lewis came to include 
representations in his account.    19 
them  less  dependent  on  the  perceptions  of  the  people  that  create  them.  The  notion  of 
investments  of  form  provides  a  theoretical  analysis  of  the  real  cost  of  moving  from  an 
indeterminate  thing  associated  to  a  simple  behavioural  regularity  to  a  qualified  object 
associated  to  a  formalised  rule.  Labels  of  quality  provide  an  excellent  illustration  of  the 
process. Once established, they create an equivalence class linking previously diverse objects 
in an attempt to draw attention to manufacturing standards as opposed to other indicators of 
quality such as personal recommendations or brand loyalty. 
Conventions, insofar as they involve representations of a collective, are bound up with 
normative judgments about the correct or acceptable functioning of the collective. Exploring 
this  normative  dimension  of  coordination,  Boltanski  and  Thévenot  (2006)  showed  that 
different conceptions of justice, each relying on its own conception of the common good, can 
be associated with the most general forms of observed coordination. Consequently, the EC 
develops and defends six generalisable conventions (or “orders of worth”). Each of these 
corresponds to a specific form of coordination and a specific conception of worth. Market 
transactions are placed in the context of a plurality of possible forms of agreement rather than 
holding the privileged position they do in mainstream economics. For a concise presentation 







Mode of evaluation 
(worth) 





Inspired  Grace, 
nonconformity, 
creativeness 
Emotional  Passion  Creativity, ingenuity 
Domestic  Esteem, reputation  Oral, exemplary, 
anecdotal 
Trust  Authority 
Civic  Collective interest  Formal, official  Solidarity  Equality 
Opinion  Renown  Semiotic  Recognition  Celebrity 
Market  Price  Monetary  Exchange  Desire, purchasing, 
power 









                                                 
25 A more detailed account can be found in Boltanski and Thévenot (2006).   20 
In practice, these six main  constitutive conventions  (or orders of worth) and their 
attendant forms of coordination tend to get mixed and combined with each other. But they are 
also mixed with small-scale, local conventions that are less transposable to other contexts. 
That is why, in addition to the first plurality of orders of worth, there is a second type of 
diversity in the forms of coordination discussed by the EC: a distinction between different 
“regimes of engagement” (Eymard-Duvernay, Favereau, Orléan, Salais and Thévenot 2005). 
Regimes  of  engagement  rank  interactions  according  to  the  extent  to  which  they  can  be 
extended to different people and situations ranging from no possible extension to universal 
generalization (the orders of worth).
26  
This brief presentation of the concept of convention as understood within the EC 
tradition will allow us to return to our argument where we left off at the end of Part II. It is 
now a matter of showing how the dynamics of this reformulated notion of convention rely on 
the transformation of uncertainty
27. 
According  to  the  EC,  a  convention  can  be  distinguished  from  a  subjective 
representation because it is hypothetically shared and this „sharedness‟ is subject to a test. 
Tests serve, amongst other things, to introduce a dynamic element to the study of conventions. 
Conventionalists speak more generally of a test when an action and its consequences serve to 
establish or discredit a particular collective representation and its associated hypotheses: the 
existence of a convention is verified by the success or failure of coordination. Success can be 
evaluated in a number of different ways ranging from the presence or absence of behavioural 
adjustments to the achievement of external quantifiable goals through the use of objective 
indicators. In this last case for example, the test would normally be achieved through the use 
of an external device.  
  Thus,  coordination  can  be  a  continuous  process  of  testing.  However,  what  agents 
count as tests also depends on the convention insofar as it determines their perception of 
uncertainty.  In  other  words,  the  definition  of  (epistemic)  uncertainty  –  from  the  agents‟ 
perspective  –  becomes  conventional  itself.  Following  Knight,  Salais  and  Storper  (1997) 
suggest  two  ways  of  apprehending  uncertainty:  specialisation  and  consolidation. 
Consolidation is the process by which agents aggregate things into a class or group and then 
measure the deviation from the overall tendency probabilistically. In other words, the agents 
reduce uncertainty to risk – though only at the epistemic level. In Part I we showed how this 
                                                 
26 For a concise presentation of the regimes of engagement, see Thévenot (2000). 
27 For a presentation of these dynamics that focuses directly on the normative dimension of convention see 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2007).   21 
reduction of uncertainty to risk was taken for granted at an ontological level by game theorists 
thereby excluding the dynamic account proposed by the EC.  
Specialisation, on the other hand, is a process that recognises the uniqueness of things. 
True uncertainty is maintained from the agents‟ perspective since they remain aware of the 
fundamental uncertainty that characterises their interactions with each other. In practice, small 
gaps between expected outcomes and actual behaviour do not necessarily lead to the collapse 
of conventions because repeated success in coordination leads to increased confidence in the 
established practices and reduces the need for interpretation and questioning. Thus, when new 
problems or impediments to coordination eventually arise, there is a tendency to discount 
their  importance  and  stick  to  the  established  practice.  In  this  manner  conventional 
coordination leads to a weakening of the critical capacities of agents to the point where they 
are  less  reflective.  According  to  conventionalists  it  is  this  process  that  accounts  for  the 
automatic  feel  of  some  conventional  behaviour:  „hardened‟  conventions  become  routines 
(Salais and Storper 1997; Favereau and Le Gall 2002).  
In  contrast,  the  equivalences  that  underpin  the  different  orders  of  worth  and  their 
respective tests can be the subject of continuous debate. Cases where coordination breaks 
down and past actions and assumptions are critically investigated are usually the result of 
perceived injustices felt by all or part of the community concerned. Outside of these cases of 
disagreement  however,  people  are  usually  engaged  in  much  more  peaceful  and  cohesive 
collaboration. Under these conditions their reflective capacities are more likely to be engaged 
when faced with tests of worth which are quite often routine elements of daily life (such as 
annual reviews at work and salary negotiations). 
These variations in agents‟ degrees of reflexivity make convention and uncertainty 
fundamentally dynamic concepts. Conventions are the current states of a reversible process of 
consolidation  or  deconstruction  depending  on  whether  they  are  automatic  or  subject  to 
questioning. Throughout this process individual perceptions of conventions can vary from a 
highly naturalised view (that they are immutable facts) to a constructivist view (that they are 
up for grabs). In positing reflexive agents capable of seeing their coordinated activities as 
constructed and therefore also capable of doubt and change, the EC has extended the role of 
true uncertainty as proposed by the Post Keynesians. Nevertheless, perfectly reflexive agents 
who are unable to see at least some established practices as natural would be faced with chaos 
and would consequently be incapable of action. Conventionalists redress  this  problem by 
adopting a more realistic theory of limited reflexivity (Bessis 2008).    22 
We  have  also  highlighted  that,  in  speaking  of  conventions  as  states  of  a  process 
governed by variation in the degrees of reflexivity of agents, conventionalists refer both to the 
way in which conventions are understood by agents (an epistemic dimension) but also to the 
actual variation in conventional practices (an ontological dimension). Even if conventions are 
understood  naturalistically,  actual  behaviour  can  be  sufficiently  diverse  to  produce  a 
multitude  of  variations  of  the  same  convention
28. These can be seen as small adaptive 
variations based on the fact that a given situation is never reproduced identically. Once seen 
as constructed however, conventions can be changed consciously and deliberately. There is a 
qualitative difference between these two types of change: whilst the former is a process  of 





We  have  shown  how  contrasting  visions  of  the  relationship  between  uncertainty  and 
convention are crucial to the demarcation between self-consciously heterodox and mainstream 
theories of social coordination. On the one hand, game theorists employ mathematical tools to 
generate and maintain stable outcomes in their models. These are inevitably presented as 
solution concepts, and one of their principle aims is to reduce or eliminate uncertainty. We 
have seen how this tradition, for all its mathematical sophistication, relies on an interpretation 
of uncertainty as risk and cannot accommodate the conception of true uncertainty as described 
and developed by the Post Keynesians. Finally, we have sketched an alternative theory of 
conventions  that  takes  true  uncertainty  seriously  and  departs  from  the  conception  of 
conventions as solutions. We now conclude with some observations on the implications of 
this study for the question of pluralism in economics. 
  Significant  developments  within  economics,  principally  through  the  rise  of  game 
theory, have contributed to widening the scope of economic analysis. The case of convention 
is  a  prime  example  of  this.  A  phenomenon  like  convention,  which  might  have  been 
considered  either  uninteresting  or  perhaps  threatening  to  an  earlier  set  of  neoclassical 
theoretical concerns, has been brought much closer to the core of mainstream research. In 
terms  of  theoretical  interests,  the  overlap  with  the  heterodoxy  has  undoubtedly  become 
significant. Nevertheless, doubts about compatibility can immediately be raised upon closer 
examination of the details of heterodox and mainstream theories of convention.  
                                                 
28 Which remains the same convention precisely because it is not subject to questioning and further interpretation 
by the agents.   23 
Our analysis reveals a clear cut divergence in methods: a modelling emphasis in the 
case of classical and evolutionary game theory; and a more descriptive and historical focus in 
the case of the two radical Keynesian positions. The methodological disparity is justified by a 
more fundamental split. Post Keynesians and conventionalists defend both the ontological and 
the epistemic components of true uncertainty, whilst game theorists deny them. Our analysis 
suggest that, whilst the study of convention shows that there has been significant change in 
the aims and scope of mainstream economics, the transformation of convention from social 
phenomenon to solution concept in the hands of game theorists demonstrates a commitment to 
methodological  monism.  In  this  case  at  least,  apparent  theoretical  diversity  is  not 
accompanied by genuine pluralism of methods.   24 
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